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THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
TOWARD A REMEDY FOR PAST AND
CONTINUING WRONGS*
S. James Anaya**
Whereas, prior to the arrival of the first Europeans
in 1778, the Native Hawaiian people lived in a highly
organized, self-sufficient, subsistent social system
based on communal land tenure with a sophisticated
language, culture, and religion;
Whereas a unified monarchical government of the
Hawaiian Islands was established in 1810 under
Kamehameha I, the first King of Hawaii;
Whereas, from 1826 until 1893, the United States
recognized the independence of the Kingdom of
Hawaii, extended full and complete diplomatic
recognition to the Hawaiian Government, and entered
into treaties and conventions with the Hawaiian
monarchs to govern commerce and navigation in
1826, 1842, 1849, 1875, and 1887;
Whereas the health and well-being of the Native
Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep
feelings and attachment to the land;
Whereas the long-range economic and social chang-
es in Hawaii over the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries have been devastating to the population and
* © Copyright S. James Anaya. This Article was written as part of a larger study on the
obligations of the United States toward the Native Hawaiian people, coordinated by the
Native Hawaiian Advisory Council and funded by the Ford Foundation.
** Professor of Law, University of Iowa; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Tulsa,
Fall, 1993. J.D., Harvard University; BA., University of New Mexico. The author gratefully
acknowledges the useful comments by Lakshman Guruswamy, Davianna Pomaika'i
McGregor, Elizabeth Pa Martin, and Nicholas Rostow on previous drafts of this Article.
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to the health and well-being of the Hawaiian people;
Whereas the Native Hawaiian people are deter-
mined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territory, and their cultur-
al identity in accordance With their own spiritual and
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and
social institutions;
Whereas it is proper and timely for the Congress on
the occasion of the impending one hundredth anniver-
sary of the event, to acknowledge the historic signifi-
cance of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawaii, to express its deep regret to the Native
Hawaiian people, and to support the reconciliation
efforts of the State of Hawaii and the United Church
of Christ with Native Hawaiians; Now, therefore, be
it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
The Congress-
(1) on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the
illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on
January 17, 1893, acknowledges the historical signifi-
cance of this event which resulted in the suppression
of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian
people;
(2) recognizes and commends efforts of reconcilia-
tion initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United
Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians;
(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the
people of the United States for the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the
participation of agents and citizens of the United
310 [Vol. 28:309
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States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native
Hawaiians to self-determination;
(4) expresses its commitment to acknowledge the
ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for
reconciliation between the United States and the
Native Hawaiian people; and
(5) urges the President of the United States to also
acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation
efforts between the United States and the Native
Hawaiian people.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent joint resolution by the United States Congress is a
significant development responsive to tireless efforts by the
indigenous or Native Hawaiian people, the modem-day descendants
of the people living in the Islands before the arrival of Westerners
two centuries ago. Native Hawaiians, who as a group do not
qualify for federal programs or statutory benefits aimed at Native
Americans generally, have pressed demands for redress for
historical and continuing wrongs with increasing vigor over the last
several years.2 The Native Hawaiian movement has prompted
initiatives within Congress and by the State of Hawaii toward
eventual resolution of Native Hawaiian claims.' However, despite
1 S.J. Res. 19, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
' For descriptions of the beginnings and philosophical impetus for contemporary Native
Hawaiian political activism, which generally has become known as -the "Hawaiian
sovereignty movement," see MICHAEL KIoNI DuDLEY & KEONI KEALOHA AGARD, A HAWAIIAN
NATION H: A CALL FOR HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY 107-27 (1990); Mililani B. Trask, Historical
and Contemporary Hawaiian Self-Determination: A Native Hawaiian Perspective, 8 ARIZ.
J. INVL & COMP. L. 77 (1991); Davianna McGregor, Hawaiians Organizing in the 1970's, 7
AMERASIA J. 2 (1980).
" These include, in addition to the recent joint resolution, S.J. Res. 19, supra note 1,
legislative initiatives within Congress, e.g., Native Hawaiian Education Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
297, § 4001, 102 Stat. 358; S. Rep. No. 309, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (recommending
passage of Native Hawaiian Health Care Improvement Act); see also Native Hawaiian
Reparations: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., S411-16.3 (1988), and recent state legislation establishing a framework for dialogue
on a form of Hawaiian autonomous governance, e.g., Act 359, 17th Haw. Leg. Res. Session,
1994]
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the recently enacted joint resolution of Congress acknowledging
injustices against the Native Hawaiian people, their claims for
meaningful redress remain substantially unresolved.
This Article seeks to demonstrate how the official response to
Native Hawaiian claims is a matter of international law, particu-
larly human rights law, and not just a matter subject to whatever
domestic law or policy considerations might apply. After a brief
sketch of the historical and contemporary conditions of Native
Hawaiians in Part II of this Article, Part III discusses the interna-
tional law principle of self-determination and argues that the
principle's substantive elements have been violated. Next, Part IV
describes international developments and human rights norms,
particularly concerning the world's indigenous peoples, that are
related to the principle of self-determination and relevant to Native
Hawaiians. Finally, Part V argues that the United States has a
duty under international law to take effective action to remedy the
violation of Native Hawaiian self-determination through measures
that, at a minimum, implement international norms concerning
indigenous peoples and that are based on the Native Hawaiians'
own collectively formulated preferences.
This Article does not specify the particular measures that should
be taken to remedy the past and continuing wrongs afflicting the
Native Hawaiian people. Rather, it establishes the grounds and
normative framework within international human rights law to
develop such measures through negotiation or other appropriate
procedures involving the Native Hawaiians themselves.
II. HISTORICAL INJUSTICE AND CONTINUING WRONGS4
Events and conditions have weighed heavily on the people
indigenous to Hawaii since the British explorer James Cook
1993.
" The brief historical sketch presented here is taken from the following sources: SENATE
SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, IMPROVING THE EDUCATION STATUS OF NATIVE
HAWAIIANS, S. REP. NO. 36, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-17 (1987); DUDLEY & AGARD, supra
note 2; DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 945-52 (3d ed. 1993); NATIVE HAWAIIAN
RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 1991); Daviana Pomaika'i McGregor,




initiated continuous Western contact with the Hawaiian archipela-
go in 1778. At that time, there were several hundred thousand
people living on the Islands.5
The modern-day descendants of these people, the indigenous or
Native Hawaiians, trace their origins through oral tradition to
early Polynesians and beyond them to the forces of nature. As
recounted by the Hawaiian historian Davianna Pomaika'i Mc-
Gregor,
The Hawaiian people are the living descendants of
Papa, the earth mother and Wakea, the sky father.
They also trace their origins through Kane of the
living waters found in streams and springs; Lono of
the winter rains and the life force for agricultural
crops; Kanaloa of the deep foundation of the earth,
the ocean and its currents and winds; Ku of the
thunder, war, fishing and planting; Pele of the
volcano; and thousands of deities of the forest, the
ocean, the winds, the rains and the various other
elements of nature.... This unity of humans,
nature and the gods formed the core of the Hawaiian
people's philosophy, world view, and spiritual belief
system.6
The Hawaiian world view shaped political and social institutions
in existence at the time of Western contact. Hawaiians lived
within a system of interrelated chiefdoms and communal land
tenure. The basic land unit was the communal ahupua'a, which
typically included irrigated agricultural land and access to the sea.
The cultivation of taro and fishing were at the center of an economy
that produced a surplus supportive of a relatively developed social
' At the time of initial contact with the Islands, Cook's entourage estimated the
population at 400,000. McGregor, supra note 4, at n.5. A recent study places the population
at the time of Cook's arrival at between 800,000 and one million. DAVID E. STANNARD,
BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF HAWAI'I ON THE EVE OF WESTERN CONTACT 32-37
(1989). See also ROBERT C. SCHMIDT, DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS OF HAWAII 1778-1965, 3-4
(1968) (estimating that approximately 300,000 persons were living on the Islands upon
Cook's arrival but that within 50 years the population fell by 50%).
' McGregor, supra note 4, at 3.
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structure integrating the entire archipelago. As foreigners arrived
in greater numbers in the early nineteenth century, the Islands
became unified under a single high chief or king, Kamehameha I.
Political unification was instrumental in preserving the indigenous
land tenure system in the face of the onslaught of foreigners, and
it also provided a central leadership with which foreigners could
deal.
It was not long before substantial foreign influence came to bear
upon the Hawaiian people and their government. Traders seeking
commercial advantage and proselytizing missionaries were the first
to attempt aggressively to reshape Hawaiian cultural, economic and
political life. The Hawaiian land tenure system came under
heightened pressure as foreigners sought land for themselves and
settled in Hawaii in increasing numbers. Ka Mahele (The Land
Division) of 1848 was the transformation of traditional Hawaiian
land tenure into a property regime that facilitated the alienation of
lands and hence was more suited to Western economic interests.7
By the late nineteenth century, foreigners, mostly American, owned
over a million acres in Hawaii and leased another three-quarters
of a million acres of government, or Crown lands, at near nominal
rates.
In 1887, a group of American residents with United States
military support forced the Hawaiian monarch, King Kalakaua, to
sign what has become known as the "Bayonet Constitution." Under
the 1887 Constitution, the King was reduced to a figurehead, and
the Hawaiian government was placed in the hands of a United
States-dominated cabinet. Any pretense of constitutional regularity
was disregarded in 1893 when United States troops invaded Hawaii
and helped depose the King's successor, Queen Liliuokalani, and
replace her with a provisional government. American residents
' Ka Mthele involved the formal division and quitclaiming of ahupua'a and other lands
to the king and to 245 chiefs, followed by the lifting of restrictions on the alienation of
property. NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 6-9. Further description
of Ka Mdhele and its ramifications is in JON J. CHINEN, ORIGINAL LAND TITLES IN HAWAII,
55 (1961); LILKALA KAME 'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA PONO
AI? (1992); Marion Kelly, Land Tenure in Hawaii, 7 AMERASIA J. 57 (1980). See also DUDLEY
& AGARD, supra note 2, at 7 (describing Ka Mahele as the result of a king who "succumbed
increasingly to the advice of whites in his Cabinet.... [The whites] scared an unwilling king
and his chiefs into establishing private property") (citations omitted).
314 [Vol. 28:309
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subsequently established the short-lived "Republic of Hawaii" and
forced the imprisoned Queen to abdicate officially. The United
States formally annexed Hawaii in 1898, despite the fact that the
only expression of indigenous Hawaiian opinion on the issue was
a petition to Congress, signed by about 29,000 Hawaiians, protest-
ing the annexation.
Thus, Hawaii became a territory of the United States among the
ranks of colonial territories of other Western powers driven by the
forces of empire. The Organic Act of 1900 set up a territorial
government headed by a governor appointed by the United States.
Under the territorial government, the remnants of Hawaiian land
tenure, other traditional or customary institutions, and cultural
practices, including the use of the Hawaiian language, were
suppressed. This was in keeping with Western thinking, which
regarded non-Western cultures as inferior, coupled with an official
policy of assimilating the indigenous Hawaiians into American
cultural life. With annexation, furthermore, the Hawaiian Crown
and government lands, in which the Hawaiian people were to have
an interest following the Mdhele, passed to the United States, and
the private acquisitive forces of American Manifest Destiny were
altogether unleashed.
In the process of Western encroachment culminating in the 1898
annexation,
many Hawaiians found they no longer could farm or
gain access to the traditional gathering areas in the
mountains and the ocean that once supported them.
Other Hawaiians were left landless. As a result,
many were forced to move to urban areas to seek
employment. They abandoned traditional subsis-
tence living, which had supported the Hawaiian
culture for centuries. Many Hawaiians became
members of the "floating population crowding into
the congested tenement districts of the larger towns
and cities of the Territory" under conditions which
many believed would "inevitably result in the exter-
mination of the race."
Stripped of their resource base, Hawaiians faced a
cultural crisis and the decimation of their population.
1994] 315
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In the century following Western contact, hundreds
of thousands of Hawaiians died from a variety of
infectious diseases introduced by the white man.
Ailments seldom fatal to foreigners were deadly for
Hawaiians who had acquired no immunity to these
diseases. Under conservative estimates, from 1778
to 1893, the Hawaiian population dropped by at least
87 percent, from approximately 300,000 to less than
40,000. More recent theorists believe that this
population decline has been grossly understated.8
In 1910, recognizing latent, deteriorating social and economic
conditions among indigenous Hawaiians, the United States
Congress amended the Organic Act to facilitate homesteading
under an 1895 law of the Republic of Hawaii. The 1910 amend-
ment was followed by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of
1920,' which set aside approximately 200,000 acres of public lands
for Native Hawaiian homesteads." Neither piece of legislation,
however, had much effect on the overall conditions of indigenous
Hawaiians. Despite a backlog of homestead applicants, most of the
land set aside by the 1920 Act has yet to be distributed, and what
has been is largely unsuitable for agriculture. Observers surmise
that the legislation was mostly calculated to benefit large agricul-
tural business by limiting the availability of land necessary to meet
the needs of Hawaiian homesteaders and by terminating home-
steading by the general public." Subsequent legislation similarly
has failed to wrest Native Hawaiians from a severely disadvan-
taged condition.
The 1959 Statehood Admission Act, by which Hawaii passed from
its colonial status and became one of the United States, transferred
to the State of Hawaii most of the lands that had been ceded to the
8 NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 44 (quoting S. Cong. Rec. 2, 10th
Leg. of Territory of Hawaii, 1919 SENATE J. 25-26).
' Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 108 (1920).
10 Id.
" E.g., DUDLEY & AGARD, supra note 2, at 71; Marilyn Vause, The Hawaiian Homes




United States at annexation in 1898.12 The State, however, failed
for years to act effectively on its trust obligation specified in the Act
to hold the lands in part "for the betterment of the conditions of
Native Hawaiians." 13 'The State amended its constitution in
197814 in what is generally considered a meager step toward
addressing Native Hawaiian concerns over the ceded lands trust.
The 1978 constitutional amendments created the Office of Hawai-
ian Affairs, which is managed by a Native Hawaiian board of
trustees elected by Native Hawaiians in a special election. 15 The
board receives and expends the portion of income from the trust
lands that is allocable to Native Hawaiians. 6
Plundered by two centuries of Western encroachment and left
virtually landless, Native Hawaiians living on the Islands today
number around 204,000-about one fifth of the Islands' popula-
tion.'7 As a group, Native Hawaiians comprise the most economi-
cally disadvantaged and otherwise ill-ridden sector of the Islands'
population. According to statistical data compiled over the last
several years, Native Hawaiians are overrepresented among the
ranks of welfare recipients and prison inmates and are underrep-
resented among high school and college graduates, professionals,
and political officials.' 8 In a recent survey of data on Hawaiian
health conditions, Richard Kekuni Blaisdell, an eminent indigenous
Hawaiian medical doctor, concluded:
The above data document the worst health profile
for Kanaka Maoli [indigenous Hawaiians] compared
12 Hawaii Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(b), 73 Stat. 5 (1959). Approximately 1.4
million acres were ceded to the State, and approximately 400,000 acres were retained by the
federal government.
s Id. § 5(f).
14 HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 4-6.
I5 1d. § 5.1 Id. §6.
17 Richard Kekuni Blaisdell, The Health Status of Kdnaka Maoli (Indigenous Hawaiians),
ASIAN AM. & PAC. ISLAND J. HEALTH (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 4, on file with
author) (citing data compiled by the State of Hawaii Health Surveillance Program). In
addition to the Native Hawaiians who live in the Islands, an estimated 90,000 live in the
continental United States. Id.
18 See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 4, at 951 (citing state, federal and non-governmental
data sources). Additional data is compiled by and available from the Native Hawaiian
Advisory Council, Honolulu, Hawaii.
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to the other ethnic groups in their homeland. Since
Kanaka Maoli are alienated by the Western health
care system, the adverse health statistics of the
Kanaka Maoli are probably underreported. Other
unfavorable socioeconomic indicators, previously
identified, suggest long-standing, broad and deep,
causal factors in the fabric of the islands' colonial
multi-ethnic society, rather than only proximate
factors narrowly confined to ill-health.19
Without an effective land base, surviving Native Hawaiian
customs-intertwined with land use and stewardship patterns-are
suppressed. Access to and protection of sacred sites, including the
volcano deity Pele, have been matters of particularly intense
struggle for Native Hawaiians. Other remaining aspects of Native
Hawaiian cultural life have trouble breathing, much less flourish-
ing, as Native Hawaiians are further subsumed within a majority
settler population with its cultural roots elsewhere. Native
Hawaiians are governed by Western-oriented institutions that,
while essentially democratic, scarcely reflect Native Hawaiians'
own distinctive values and traditions and are dominated by the
majority settler population. In her recent book, From a Native
Daughter, Huanani-Kay Trask with poignant eloquence observes of
present-day Hawaii:
On the ancient burial grounds of our ancestors,
glass and steel shopping malls with layered parking
lots stretch over what were once the most ingenious-
ly irrigated taro lands, lands that fed millions of our
people over thousands of years. Large bays, delicate-
ly ringed long ago with well-stocked fishponds, are
now heavily silted and cluttered with jet skis, wind-
surfers, and sailboats. Multi-story hotels disgorge
over six million tourists a year onto stunningly
beautiful (and easily polluted) beaches, closing off
access to locals. On the major islands of Hawai'i,
Maui, O'ahu, and Kaua'i, meanwhile, military
1 BlaisdeU, upra note 17 (manuscript at 23, on file with author).
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airfields, training camps, weapons storage facilities,
and exclusive housing and beach areas remind the
Native Hawaiian who owns Hawai'i: the foreign,
colonizing country called the United States of Ameri-
ca.
... Economically, the statistic of thirty tourists
for every Native means that land and water, public
policy, law and the general political attitude are
shaped by the ebb and flow of tourist industry
demands. For Hawaiians, the inundation of foreign-
ers decrees marginalization in our own land.
The State of Hawai'i, meanwhile, pours millions
into the tourism industry, even to the extent of
funding a [tourism] booster club....
Rather than stem the flood, the state is projecting
a tidal wave of 12 million tourists by the year 2010,
and encouraging rocket-launching facilities and
battleship homeporting as added economic "security."
For my people, this latest degradation is but
another stage in the agony that began with the first
footfall of European explorers in 1778, shattering two
millennia of Hawaiian civilization characterized by
an indigenous way of caring for the land, called
mdlama ' ina.20
In sum, after long-standing neglect, the United States Congress,
with good reason, has turned its attention to the past and present
of the Native Hawaiian people.




III. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION 2 1
Self-determination is a foundational principle of international law
that bears particularly upon the status and rights of the Native
Hawaiian people in light of their history and contemporary
conditions. Mention of self-determination within contemporary
political discourse often raises the specter of destabilization and
even violent turmoil.22 And indeed, much violence has occurred
in the world of late in association with extremist self-determination
rhetoric formulated around ethnic chauvinism. With attention to
widely shared values and processes of decision that are fairly
associated with the concept of self-determination, however, it is
possible to identify self-determination as a stabilizing force in the
international system and relevant to peaceful resolution of Native
Hawaiian claims.
In the following pages, self-determination is identified as a
universe of human rights precepts concerned broadly with peoples,
including the Native Hawaiian people, and grounded in the idea
that all are equally entitled to be in control of their own destinies.
The substance of the principle of self-determination is distinguished
from remedial prescriptions that may follow violations of the
substantive norm. In brief, the substance of self-determination
entails two strains: First, self-determination requires that the
governing institutional order substantially be the creation of
constitutional processes guided by the will of the people, or peoples,
governed. Second, self-determination requires that the governing
institutional order, independently of the processes leading to its
creation or alteration, be one under which people may live and
develop freely on a continuous basis. In its remedial aspect also
applicable here, self-determination gives rise to remedies that tear
at the legacies of empire, discrimination, suppression of democratic
participation, and cultural suffocation.
21 This part draws substantially from the author's previous article, S. James Anaya, A
Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (1993), in which the theoretical grounding for the conception of self-
determination invoked here is set forth more fully.
22 See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDAEMONIUM (1993) (painting bleak
picture of contemporary self-determination movements).
320 [Vol. 28:309
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A. THE CHARACTER AND SCOPE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
1. Generally. The concept of self-determination is part of
international law's expanding lexicon of human rights; it extends
from philosophical affirmation of the human drive to translate
aspiration into reality, coupled with postulates of inherent human
equality.' "Self-determination of peoples" is featured in the
United Nations Charter as among the organization's founding
principles. 4 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which the United States also is a party, holds out self-
determination as a "right" of "[a]ll peoples,"' as does the Helsinki
Final Act which was signed by the United States as a leading
participant in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe.26 Other major international human rights instruments
that affirm the principle or right of self-determination include the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,27
" See Edward M. Morgan, The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination, 20 INT'L L.
& POL. 355, 357-58 (1988) (delineating modem self-determination as arising from Kantian
principles). Scholars frequently cite the normative precepts of freedom and equality invoked
in the American revolt against British rule and the overthrow of the French monarchy as
progenitors of the modem concept of self-determination. See, e.g., UMOZURIKE 0.
UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-11 (1972) (outlining role of self-
determination in American and French Revolutions); Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION ix (1979) (citing American and French Revolutions as early manifestations
of self-determination). Core human rights values associated with the concept of self-
determination, however, clearly are not solely within the province of the history of Western
thought. See generally Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presense of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
1971 I.C.J. 16,77-78 (June 21) (separate opinion of Vice President Ammoun) (identifying self-
determination with "[t]wo streams of thought.., established on the two opposite shores of
the Mediterranean").
2 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 12.
' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 1 1, G. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53, U.N. Doe A/6316 (1966). The self-determination
provision of the Covenant reads: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development." Id.
" Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, princ. VIII, Aug.
1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295.
" International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, 1, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966). The self-
determination provision of this multilateral treaty is identical to that of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, at 53. Self-determination is affirmed
by substantially the same language in other U.N.-sponsored international instruments. E.g.,
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and the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.' Addi-
tionally, self-determination is widely acknowledged to be a principle
of customary international law and even jus cogens, a peremptory
norm. 
29
Extending from core values of human freedom and equality,
expressly associated with peoples instead of states, and affirmed in
a number of international human rights instruments, the principle
of self-determination is properly understood to benefit human
beings as human beings and not sovereign entities as such.' But
while human beings are the beneficiaries of self-determination, the
objects of the principle are the institutions of government under
which human beings live.
The principle of self-determination comprises a standard of
legitimacy against which institutions of government are measured.
In its most prominent modern manifestation within the interna-
tional system, self-determination has precipitated the demise of
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, princ. V, GA
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration]; Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sees.,
Supp. No. 16, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
' Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 20, June 27, 1981, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 59, 62.
2 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (4th ed. 1990)
(citing self-determination as jus cogens); Hdctor Gros Espiell, Self-Determination and Jus
Cogens, in UN LAw/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 167, 167 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979) (same); see
also HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 45 (1990);
PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 14 (1991)
(stating self- determination to be possiblyjus cogens); MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY
IN AFRICA 89 (1986) (stating self-determination may be "customary right" of international
law).
30 See AURELIN CRISTESCU, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL AND
CONTEmPORARY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS, at 31, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21404/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.80Y-V.3 (1981) (Cristescu was Special
Rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities) [hereinafter U.N. STUDY ON SELF-DETERMINATION] ("The principles of equal
rights and self-determination ... is [sic] part of the group of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."); Yoram Dinstein, Self-Determination and the Middle East Conflict, in SELF-
DETERMINATION: NATIONAL REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 243 (Yonah Alexander &
Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980) ("Self-determination must be perceived as an international
human right."); Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS




colonial institutions of government and the emergence of a new
political order for subject peoples."1 Also, the international
community, through the United Nations, declared illegitimate
South Africa's governing institutional order, with its previously
entrenched system of apartheid, on grounds of self-determina-
tion.32  Self-determination is not separate from other human
rights norms; rather, self-determination is a configurative principle
or framework complemented by the more specific human rights
norms which in their totality enjoin the governing institutional
order. As further discussed below, this framework concerns both
the procedures by which governing institutions develop and the
form they take for their ongoing functioning.
2. Native Hawaiians as Beneficiaries of Self-Determination. Like
all human rights norms, self-determination is presumptively
universal in scope and thus must be assumed to benefit all
segments of humanity." Self-determination's linkage with the
term "peoples" in international instruments,34 however, indicates
the collective or group character of the principle. Self-determina-
tion is concerned with human beings not simply as individuals with
autonomous will but, moreover, as social creatures engaged in the
constitution and functioning of communities and corresponding
institutions of human interaction and control. In its plain meaning,
the term "peoples" undoubtedly embraces the Native Hawaiian
people, who comprise a distinct community with its own social,
31 See UMOZURIKE, supra note 23, at 11-15 (discussing decolonization as a manifestation
of the U.N. Charter-based principle of self-determination).
32 See GA. Res. 2775, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 41, U.N. Dec. A/8429
(1971) (condemning apartheid generally); GAL Res. 3411, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No.
34, at 36, U.N. Dec. A/10034 (1975) (repeating previous condemnation); see also S.C. Res.
392, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., at 11, U.N. Doc. Sf12103 (1976) (condemning South African
government's use of violence); GA. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sss., Supp. No. 30, at 75,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (calling apartheid "crime against humanity").
33 Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 14,17
(Richard P. Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992) ("[If a right is determined to be
a human right it is quintessentially general or universal in character, in some sense equally
possessed by all human beings everywhere, including in certain instances even the unborn.").




cultural, and political attributes rooted in history. 5
Many have interpreted the use of the term "peoples" in this
connection as restricting the scope of self-determination. The
principle of self-determination is deemed concerned only with
"peoples" in the sense of a limited universe of narrowly defined,
mutually exclusive communities entitled a priori to the full range
of sovereign powers including independent statehood. This
interpretation, however, is flawed in its underlying vision of a
world reduced to a grid of statehood categories-a vision that
obscures the human rights character of self-determination and
diminishes the relevance of self-determination values in a world in
which states are not altogether coextensive with spheres of
community. The statehood model for interpreting the term
"peoples" corresponds with post-Westphalian Western political
theory in that it is not alive to the rich variety of non-state
groupings actually found in the human experience, nor to associa-
tional patterns leading to enhanced interconnectedness among
various segments of humanity.36
Any model of self-determination that does not take into account
the existence of multiple patterns of human association and
interdependency is at best incomplete and more likely distorted. As
a human rights principle incorporating values relevant to modern
trends and conditions, self-determination has meaning for the
multiple and overlapping spheres of human association and
political ordering that characterize humanity. Appropriately
understood, therefore, self-determination benefits individuals and
groups throughout the spectrum of humanity's complex web of
interrelationships and loyalties, not just groups defined by existing
or perceived sovereign boundaries. In a world of increasingly
overlapping and integrated political spheres, self-determination
' See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. Webster's Dictionary defines "peoples" as
"a body of persons that are united by a common culture, tradition, or sense of kinship, that
typically have common language, institutions, and beliefs, and that often constitute a
politically organized group." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 860 (10th ed.
1993).
' See S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in
Historical and Contemporary Perspective, in 1989 HARVARD INDIAN LAW SYMPOSIuM 191,
197-98 (1990) (discussing post-Westphalian model of mutually exclusive spheres of territory,
community, and centralized political authority).
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concerns human beings in regard to the constitution and function-
ing of all levels and forms of government under which they live.
The Native Hawaiian people thus are beneficiaries of the
principle of self-determination. They are entitled to self-determina-
tion under international law not because they meet some statehood-
oriented threshold criteria of "peoplehood," but rather, because they
are human beings: human beings who, like those among other
segments of humanity, possess and value community bonds within
a seamless global web of human interaction. As multiple and
overlapping structures of local, regional, and global governance
evolve, the community bonds of Native Hawaiians are to be valued
no less than others.
3. Substantive vs. Remedial Aspects of Self-Determination. Given
the prominence of decolonization in the international practice of
self-determination, decolonization provides a point of reference for
understanding the scope and content of self-determination. It is
erroneous, however, to go so far as to equate self-determination
with the decolonization regime. Decolonization has entailed a
particular category of subjects, prescriptions, and procedures.37
Decolonization prescriptions do not themselves embody the
substance of the principle of self-determination, but rather they
correspond with measures to remedy a sui generis deviation from
the principle existing in the prior condition of colonialism in its
classical form.
Self-determination precepts comprise a world order standard with
which colonialism was at odds and with which other institutions of
government also may conflict. The substantive content of the
principle of self-determination, therefore, inheres in the precepts by
which the international community has held colonialism to be
illegitimate and which apply universally to benefit all human
beings individually and collectively. The substance of the
norm-the precepts that define the standard-must be distin-
guished from the remedial prescriptions that may follow a violation
of the norm, such as those developed to undo colonization. To the
extent the international community generally promotes self-
determination values, it may identify contextual deviations from
self-determination beyond those of classical colonialism and




Accordingly, while the substantive elements of self-determination
apply broadly to benefit all segments of humanity, self-determina-
tion applies more narrowly in its remedial aspect. Remedial
prescriptions and mechanisms developed by the international
community benefit groups that have suffered violations of substan-
tive self-determination. As demonstrated subsequently,' Native
Hawaiians are within the more narrow category of self-determina-
tion beneficiaries, which includes groups entitled to remedial
measures.
B. SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THEIR
VIOLATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF COLONIZATION
The Native Hawaiian people have been denied the substantive
elements of self-determination. The substance of the principle of
self-determination is structured as follows. First, in what may be
called its constitutive aspect, self-determination concerns the
occasional or episodic procedures that create institutions of
government. Secondly, in what may be called its ongoing aspect,
self-determination concerns the form, content, and functioning of
the governing institutional order itself. The Native Hawaiian
people have lived under a governing institutional or-
der-constructed upon patterns of colonization and yet fully
responsive to latent inequities-that is deficient in both regards.
1. Constitutive Self-Determination. In self-determination's
constitutive aspect, core values of freedom and equality translate
into a requirement that institutions of government be created
according to the will of the people governed. Constitutive self-
determination does not itself dictate the outcome of procedures
leading to the creation of or change in the governing institutional
order; where such procedures occur, however, constitutive self-
determination requires participation and consent such that the end
result in the political order reflects the collective will of the people,
or peoples, concerned. This aspect of self-determination corre-
sponds with the provision common to the International Human
Rights Covenants and other instruments which state that peoples
3
8 See infra notes 44-51, 55 and accompanying text.
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"freely determine their political status" by virtue of the right of self-
determination.39 It is not possible to identify precisely the bounds
of international consensus concerning the required levels and
means of individual or group participation in all contexts of
institutional birth or change. Certain minimum standards,
however, are evident.
Colonization was rendered illegitimate in part by reference to the
processes leading to colonial rule, processes that today clearly
represent impermissible territorial expansion of governmental
authority.40 The world community now holds in contempt the
imposition of government structures upon people, regardless of
their social or political makeup. 1 The world community now
accepts President Woodrow Wilson's admonition, elaborating upon
his view of self-determination in the midst of the European turmoil
of World War I, that "no right anywhere exists to hand peoples
' International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 27, art.
1, 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 1, 1 1. The
full text of art. 1, 1 of the Covenants is quoted at supra note 25. See also United Nations
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 27, at 123 (affirming self-determination by almost
identical language).
' For a description of procedures for acquiring title adopted by European states in the
colonization of Africa, see SHAW, supra note 29, at 31-58. Colonial patterns were supported
by the theory that lands not inhabited by "civilized" peoples-that is, peoples with European
characteristics ofsocial and political organization-were deemed vacant, or terra nullius, and
hence open to occupation by the "civilized." Id. at 31-39. This view is evident in the works
of late 19th-early 20th century legal theorists. See, e.g., JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136-45 (1894); LASSA F. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 134-35, 383-84 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920). See generally GERRIT W. GONG,
THE STANDARD OF "CIVILZATION" IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1984) (outlining concept of
"civilized" state).
41 See PAUL G. LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS AND DIwLOMACY OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION 150-65 (discussing government statements at the San Francisco Conference
which gave rise to the United Nations Charter); Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 27, at 67 (declaring, inter alia, that "[tihe
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial
of fundamental human rights"); United Nations Centre for Human Rights, The Effects of
Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Social and Economic Relations Between Indigenous
Peoples and States: Report of a Seminar, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/89/5 at 8 (1989) ("The concept
of 'terra nullius', 'conquest' and 'discoveryas modes of territorial acquisition are repugnant,
have no legal standing, and are entirely without merit or justification.... ."). Under modern
conceptions ofterra nullius, territory is not legally vacant if inhabited by human beings, even
if they are not organized as a "sovereign" entity. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39-40
(Jan. 3) (finding Western Sahara not terra nullius at time of Spanish colonization, a finding
not premised on the character of the political organization of the territory).
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about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." 2
Today, movement toward the creation or territorial extension of
governmental authority normally is regulated by self-determination
precepts requiring minimum levels of participation by all affect-
ed.43
The Hawaiian people are among the segment of humanity that
has suffered a violation of constitutive self-determination through
colonization in its most blatant form. Beginning with the arrival
of James Cook in the Hawaiian archipelago in 1778, the Hawaiian
people were subjected to transformative encroachments culminating
in the forced annexation of Hawaii by the United States in 1898.44
President Grover Cleveland, in office during the interim between
the United States military invasion of 1893 and the 1898 Annex-
ation Act,45 signalled the illegitimacy of the United States' occupa-
tion and annexation of Hawaii in a statement to Congress opposing
annexation:
[T]he military occupation of Honolulu by the United
States on the day mentioned was wholly without
justification, either as an occupation by consent or as
an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening
American life and property .... Fair minded people
with the evidence before them will hardly claim that
the Hawaiian Government was overthrown by the
people of the Islands or that the provisional govern-
ment had ever existed with their consent. I do not
understand that any member of this government
claims that the people would uphold it by their
suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the ques-
42 President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (May 1917), quoted in UMOZURIKE,
supra note 23, at 14.
"This is evident, for example, in the steps of institution building of the European
Community and the expansion of its territorial jurisdiction. For background on the
development of the European Community, see P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPFAN
COMMUNITY LAW 1-14 (5th ed. 1990).
"See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text (chronicling Hawaiian history since Cook's
arrival).




President Cleveland's opposition to annexation followed the advice
of his Secretary of State William Gresham, who had written:
Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but
independent State by the abuse of the authority of
the United States be undone by restoring the legiti-
mate government? Anything short of that will not,
I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice.
... Our government was the first to recognize the
independence of the Islands and it should be the last
to acquire sovereignty over them by force and
fraud.47
In its recent joint resolution, the United States Congress acknowl-
edged that the acts leading to the annexation of Hawaii, which was
consummated subsequent to President Cleveland's departure from
office, violated international law.48
Despite the injustice and illegality of the United States' forced
annexation of Hawaii, it arguably was confirmed pursuant to the
international law doctrine of effectiveness. In its traditional
formulation, the doctrine of effectiveness confirms de jure sover-
eignty over territory to the extent it is exercised de facto, without
questioning the events leading to the effective control.49  The
modern international law of self-determination, however, forges an
exception to the doctrine of effectiveness. Pursuant to the principle
of self-determination, the international community has deemed
illegitimate historical patterns giving rise to colonial rule and has
promoted corresponding remedial measures, irrespective of the
4 GROVER CLEVELAND, MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT IN AFFAIRS OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 243,
53d Cong., 2d Seas. 10, 12-13 (1893).
4' H.R. REP. No. 243, supra, note 46 at 69 (quoting William Gresham).
"S.J. RES. 19, supra note 1.
4" See OPPENHEIM, supra note 40, at 384; W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
125-26 (P. Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924).
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effective control exercised by the colonial power." Decolonization
demonstrates that constitutional processes may be judged retroac-
tively in light of self-determination values-notwithstanding
effective control-where, as in Hawaii, such processes remain
relevant to the legitimacy of governmental authority or otherwise
manifest themselves in contemporary inequities.51
2. Ongoing Self-Determination. Not only have the Hawaiian
people suffered the indignity and legacies of events associated with
Hawaii's forced incorporation into the United States, but the
resulting governmental order itself has functioned to deny the
Hawaiian people self-determination. Apart from self-determina-
tion's constitutive aspect, which conditions the procedures leading
to the governing institutional order, ongoing self-determination
enjoins the form adopted by the institutional order for its continu-
ous functioning. In essence, ongoing self-determination requires a
governing institutional order under which individuals and groups
are able to make meaningful choices in matters touching upon all
spheres of life on a continuous basis. In the words of the self-
determination provision common to the International Human
Rights Covenants and other instruments, peoples are to "freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
52
In this respect as well, the international community's condemna-
tion of colonial administration represents a minimum standard.
The world community has come to regard classical colonialism as
an oppressive form of governance, independently of its origins.53
Go Cf Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 36 (Jan. 3) (holding right of people of Western
Sahara to decolonization not affected by territory's legal status at time of colonization,
although status may be relevant to framing of decolonization procedures).
See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text (discussing decolonization).
8 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 27, art.
1, 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 1, 1. The
full text of art. 1,1 1 of the Covenants is at supra note 25. See also United Nations Friendly
Relations Declaration, supra note 27 (affirming self-determination).
" Despite the divergence of political theory at the height of the decolonization movement
in the 1950s and 1960s, a divergence that fueled the polarization of geopolitical forces until
recently, there was coincidence in precepts of freedom and equality upon which the
international community viewed colonial governance as oppressive. Compare, for example,
Stalin's anti-colonial statements in JOSEPH STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL-COLONIAL
QUESTION 314-22 (Proletarian Publishers 1925), with the policy prescriptions of United
States leaders as summarized in W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-100 (1977).
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At least since the middle part of this century, colonial structures
have been widely deplored for depriving the indigenous inhabitants
of equal status vis-A-vis the colonizers in the administration of their
affairs."
Upon annexation, the Hawaiian people were subjected to classical
colonial structures of governance until Hawaii became a state of the
United States in 1959. Native Hawaiians, who had become not
only impoverished but also vastly outnumbered by the settler
population, were rendered more and more at the margins of
political power in their own lands under colonial administration."
With its strongly Western orientation and power center, moreover,
the governing institutional order promulgated subsequent to
annexation effectively suppressed Hawaiian culture and remaining
manifestations of traditional Hawaiian land tenure, and it allowed
for the continued diminution of indigenous Hawaiian landhold-
ings.'
C. REMEDIAL ASPECTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION: THE EXPERIENCE
OF DECOLONIZATION
The international concern over colonialism and its deviation from
the substantive elements of self-determination have given rise to
remedial prescriptions and mechanisms. This remedial regime
toward decolonization corresponds with the territory of Hawaii
becoming a state of the United States. The statehood remedy,
however, has not alone provided adequate redress for the indige-
nous Hawaiians; impediments to the realization of Hawaiian self-
determination continue.
1. The Decolonization Regime. As already noted, decolonization
manifests the remedial aspect of the principle of self-determination,
54 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
AND THE THIRD WORLD 85 (1990) (discussing preponderant view of 1950s that colonialism
is "an absolute wrong: an injury to the dignity and autonomy of those peoples and of course
a vehicle for their economic exploitation and political oppression").
"See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (delineating colonial administration and
structure).
" See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing subjugation of Hawaiian land
system and diminishment of indigenous Hawaiian landholdings under United States
administration subsequent to annexation).
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as distinguished from the principle's substantive elements. 57 The
decolonization regime is in relevant part grounded in Chapter XI
of the U.N. Charter, which establishes special duties for U.N.
members that "have or assume responsibilities for the administra-
tion of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government."58 Under article 73 of Chapter XI,
such members commit themselves:
a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of
the peoples concerned, their political, economic,
social, and educational advancement, their just
treatment, and their protection against abuses;
b. to develop self-government, to take due account
of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to
assist them in the progressive development of their
free political institutions, according to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and
their varying stages of advancement...;
e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General
for information purposes, subject to such limitation
as security and constitutional considerations may
require, statistical and other information of a techni-
cal nature relating to economic, social, and educa-
tional conditions in the territories for which they are
respectively responsible ......
In its Resolution 1541 of 1960, the U.N. General Assembly clarified
that "[t]he authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in
mind that [article 73] should be applicable to territories which were
'7 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58 U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
" Id.; see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-85 (establishing parallel international trusteeship
system for a narrower category of territories compromised mostly of those previously
administered by the powers defeated in World Wars I & II).
332 [Vol. 28:309
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
then known to be of a colonial type.' ° The General Assembly has
maintained a list of territories subject to the article 73(e) reporting
requirement, and through a committee structure has deliberated
upon the reports with a view toward promoting article 73 poli-
cies.61
Article 73 and its progeny have not entailed a reversion to the
status quo prior to the historical patterns of colonization. Rather,
the remedy has led to the creation of altogether new institutional
orders viewed as appropriate to implementing self-determination.
General Assembly Resolution 1514 confirmed the practice establish-
ing the norm of independent statehood for colonial territories with
their colonial boundaries intact, regardless of the arbitrary
character of most such boundaries.62 Under the companion
Resolution 1541 and related international practice, 63 self-determi-
nation is also considered implemented for a colonial territory
through its association or integration with an independent state,
64
as long as the result is the outcome of the freely expressed wishes
of the people of the territory concerned.65
The Hawaiian territory appeared on the General Assembly's list
of non-self-governing territories until Hawaii became one of the
United States in 1959. Hawaiian statehood followed a plebiscite in
which voters were asked to choose between the status quo and
** GA. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 38, at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/4651 (1960).
"1 See ROBERT E. RIGGS & JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 225-32 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing U.N. procedures under
Chapter XI).
" See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
supra note 27, 5 ("Immediate steps shall be taken, in... Non-Self-Governing Territories
... to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories .... "); SHAW, supra note 29, at
93 (discussing arbitrary character of colonial boundaries in Africa in terms of indigenous
populations, with boundaries left intact through decolonization).
" See OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 53, at 119-28 (concluding that GA. Res. 1541 is
generally reflective of international practice in the application of the principle of self-
determination to the colonial territories).
"Under GAL Res. 1541, a territory ceases to be non-self-governing by "(a) (e]mergence
as a sovereign independent State; (b) [firee association with an independent State; or (c)
[i]ntegration with an independent State." GA. Res. 1541, supra note 60, at 10.
" See id. ("Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the
peoples of the territory concerned .... ").
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statehood.' Shortly after statehood, the United States communi-
cated to the U.N. Secretary-General the following:
Since 1946, the United States has transmitted
annually to the Secretary-General information on the
Territory of Hawaii pursuant to Article 73 e of the
Charter. However, on August 21, 1959, Hawaii
became one of the United States under a new consti-
tution taking effect on that date. In the light of this
change in the constitutional position and status of
Hawaii, the United States Government considers it
no longer necessary or appropriate to continue to
transmit information on Hawaii under article
73 e.67
The General Assembly subsequently agreed that the United States'
obligation to report on Hawaii under article 73 had expired with
Hawaii becoming a state in conjunction with a plebiscite, 68 and
Hawaii accordingly was removed from the list of non-self-governing
territories.
2. The Inadequacy of the Statehood Remedy. Although Hawaii's
territorial status gave way to statehood within the framework of
world decolonization, the statehood remedy is deficient from the
standpoint of indigenous Hawaiians. First, the procedures leading
to statehood were not in keeping with precepts of constitutive self-
determination: the statehood plebiscite did not afford indigenous
Hawaiians a meaningful opportunity to choose. Plebiscite proce-
dures allowed the majority settler population to overpower the voice
of the Native Hawaiian people who were uniquely interested in a
Hawaii reconstituted in accordance with self-determination values.
Under plebiscite rules, all United States citizens who had been
Memorandum by the Government of the United States of America Concerning the
Cessation of Transmission of Information Under Article 73e of the Charter with Regard to
Hawaii, U.N. Doc. A/4226, Annex I, at 3 (1959).
"Communication from the Government of the United States ofAmerica, U.N. GAOR, 14th
Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 36, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/4226 (1959).




resident in Hawaii for one year were allowed an equal vote.69
International practice outside the Hawaiian context has proscribed
settler participation in decolonization plebiscites, where settler
participation could potentially nullify the indigenous vote.70 The
plebiscite, furthermore, did not offer an adequate range of choices.
The choice between the status quo and statehood was perhaps
meaningful to those who assumed a priori United States sovereign-
ty over Hawaii, but it was much less meaningful as an act of self-
determination to indigenous Hawaiians on whom United States
rule had been imposed. Given these factors, the plebiscite leading
to statehood failed to cure the taint in the legitimacy of the United
States' claim to sovereignty over Hawaii and its indigenous people.
Statehood has failed otherwise to remedy the historical injustices
suffered by Native Hawaiians or to result in a condition of ongoing
self-determination for them, despite the displacement of classical
colonial structures of governance. Among the Islands' inhabitants,
Native Hawaiians continue to figure disproportionately at the
bottom tier of social and economic indicators as the result of the
colonial patterns beginning over two hundred years ago.71 And,
they are yet to have lands restored in a quantity that would
provide a viable economic or cultural base.72 In other respects,
the governing institutional order resulting in the aftermath of
statehood has not provided Native Hawaiians the accommodations
necessary to exercise and freely develop their culture, including
religious practices and traditional governance, or allowed them to
0 NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 104 n.183. See Organic Act, §
62, Revised Laws of Hawaii, v. 1 (1955) (requiring one year residency to vote in elections in
the territory of Hawaii).
" For example, the General Assembly's Special Committee on Decolonization recommend-
ed measures to ensure that the "expatriate" vote in Bermuda would not "decisively influence
the question of the future status of the Territory." Decolonization-Committee of 24 Adopts
Decisions on Bermuda, Solomons, Tokelau, Pitcairn, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., July 1977, at
23; ef G.A. Res. 2353, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1641st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/7013 (1967)
(against holding referendum for Gibraltar to determine its future status due to overwhelming
settler population there).
71 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing statistics indicating decline
in health, population, and economic status of Native Hawaiians).
" See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Western encroach-
ment on Native Hawaiian land).
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exercise their fair share of political power.7" The continuing
denial of Native Hawaiian self-determination and of the Hawaiians'
corresponding remedial entitlements is particularly evident in light
of international processes and developing norms concerning the
rights of indigenous peoples, the focus of the following part of this
Article.
IV. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES WITHIN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
Native Hawaiians are among the subjects of a developing body of
international norms concerning indigenous peoples, a body of norms
that is an adjunct to the principle of self-determination and related
human rights precepts. This developing body of law is substantial-
ly the result of activity beginning in the early 1970s and involving
international organizations and indigenous peoples themselves.
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO NEW AND EMERGENT
INTERNATIONAL NORMS CONCERNING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Over the last two decades, the international community has
established indigenous peoples or populations as special subjects of
international concern within its burgeoning human rights program.
In 1971, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities initiated a study on the "Problem of
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations."
74 The study,75
which was issued originally as a series of partial reports from 1981
to 1983,'76 made a series of findings and recommendations general-
7- See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing suppression of Native Hawaiian
political and cultural life).
" E.S.C. Res. 1589(L), U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/5044
(May 21, 1971). The study was authorized by the Commission's parent body, the Economic
and Social Council. Id.
" U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/198617 & Adds.l-4 (1986) (Jos6 R. Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur)
[hereinafter U.N. Indigenous Study].
" The original documents comprising the study are, in order of publication: U.N. Docs.




ly supportive of indigenous peoples' efforts to seek redress for past
deprivations of their human rights and to secure legal protection
for their continued survival as distinct communities with historical-
ly based cultures, political institutions, and entitlements to land.7
The U.N. study, together with the advocacy of indigenous peoples'
representatives, prompted the U.N. Economic and Social Council to
establish in 1982 the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions,7" which reviews developments concerning indigenous
peoples and has drafted a declaration on indigenous rights for
eventual consideration by the U.N. General Assembly.79 Follow-
ing the lead of the U.N. Working Group, the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), a specialized agency affiliated with the U.N.,
adopted in 1989 its Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
(No. 169),80 which already has been ratified by a number of states
and has received favorable consideration in others."' In a further
development, the General Assembly of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, on November 18, 1989, asked "the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights to prepare a juridical instrument
relative to the rights of indigenous peoples." 2 Additionally, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the U.N.
Human Rights Committee have become increasingly engaged in
adjudicating indigenous peoples' claims.8a The international focus
on indigenous peoples has been heightened by the U.N. General
Assembly's designation of 1993 as "The International Year for the
' See U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 75, Add.4 (Volume V: Conclusions and
Recommendations), U.N. Sales No. E.86 XIV.3 (1987), reprinted in 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 241 (1991).
7 E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82
(1982).
" For a description and commentary on the Working Group processes, see Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining
the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 676-82.
g Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No.
169), International Labour Conference, June 27, 1989 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991),
reprinted in 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
a' States that have ratified the Convention include Norway, Mexico, Colombia, and
Bolivia.
8 AG/Res. 1022 (XIX-0/89). The proposal for a new OAS legal instrument on indigenous
peoples' rights is described in Inter-Am. C.H.R. 245-51, OEA/ser.LJv/II.76, doc. 10 (1989).
" See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing findings of "special legal
protections" of indigenous peoples in recent cases).
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World's Indigenous People.""
Through these processes, indigenous peoples and their supporters
have been successful in moving states and other relevant actors to
an ever closer accommodation of their demands. While the
movement can be expected to continue as indigenous peoples
continue to press their cause, there already has emerged a new
constellation of international norms specifically concerned with
indigenous peoples. These norms are expressed or reflected in the
1989 ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169),
in statements by the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions and other authoritative non-governmental actors, and,
increasingly, in the diplomatic statements and behavior of the
numerous governments that have participated actively in the ILO
and Working Group procedures. Insofar as the content of these
norms and expectations of compliance with them are rooted in a
preponderance of international opinion, they are customary law and
hence generally binding upon the constituent units of the world
community regardless of treaty ratification or other formal act of
assent to the norms.8
" GA. Res. 45/164 (12 March 1991). See generally Inauguration of the 'International
Year of the World's Indigenous People," 3 TRANSNAL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1993)
(compiling related statements before the U.N. General Assembly by the U.N. Secretary-
General, indigenous peoples' representatives, and others).
' Customary norms arise when a preponderance of states and other authoritative actors
converge upon a common understanding of the norms' content through expression or actions,
and generally expect future behavior in conformity with the norms. Professors McDougal,
Lasswell and Chen describe customary law as "generally observed to include two key
elements: a 'material' element in certain past uniformities in behavior [including
communication] and a 'psychological' element, or opinio juris, in certain subjectivities of
'oughtness' attending such uniformities of behavior." MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 269 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also Louis B. Sohn,
Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary International Law, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF WILLEM RIPHAGAN (Adriaan Bos & Hugo
Siblesz eds., 1986) (discussing how multilateral dialogue in the context of treaty negotiations
may give rise to customary law in advance of ratification of the negotiated treaty).
The theoretical grounding for identifying new customary international law concerning
indigenous peoples is described in S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contempo-
rary International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 8-15 & nn. 37-59 (1991) [hereinafter
Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms].
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B. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION
The international concern for indigenous peoples is based
effectively on the identification of a sui generis deviation from the
self-determination standard, one that is in addition to the sui
generis deviation embodied in classical colonialism. Indeed, the
rubric of indigenous peoples or populations is generally understood
to refer to culturally cohesive groups that, like the Native Hawaiian
people, suffer inequities within the states in which they live as the
result of historical patterns of empire and conquest and that,
despite the contemporary absence of colonial structures in the
classical form, suffer impediments or threats to their ability to live
and develop freely in their original homelands.' The developing
constellation of indigenous rights norms, accordingly, in large
measure comprises a remedial regime, although the constellation
also contains prescriptions that detail the substantive elements of
self-determination in the specific context of indigenous peoples.
The latest U.N. Working Group draft declaration on indigenous
peoples' rights contains specific recognition of the right of indige-
nous peoples to self-determination. The 1993 draft, borrowing from
the self-determination language of the International Human Rights
Covenants, states:
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determina-
tion. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their econom-
ic, social and cultural development."
See U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 75, Add. 4, 379, which contains the following
definition:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
developed on their territories, considered themselves distinct from other
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of
them. They form at present nondominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural
patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
'7Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Agreed Upon by the Members
of the Working Group at its Eleventh Session, art. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4ISub.2/1993/29, Annex
1 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Working Group Draft Declaration].
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This express affirmation of indigenous self-determination has yet
to command a broad consensus among governments participating
in the standard-setting work of the U.N. Working Group, mostly as
a result of the misguided tendency to equate the word self-determi-
nation with decolonization procedures or with an absolute right to
form an independent state. The rhetorical sensitivity, however,
does not entail an aversion to the normative precepts underlying
the term self-determination if those precepts are understood not to
require a state for every "people." Government statements to the
U.N. Working Group and other international bodies are consistent
with the widely held belief that indigenous groups and their
members are entitled to be full and equal participants in the
creation of the institutions of government under which they live
and, further, to live within a governing institutional order in which
they are perpetually in control of their own destinies.'
Insofar as indigenous peoples have been denied self-determina-
tion thus understood, the international indigenous rights regime
prescribes remedial measures that may involve change in the
political order and hence, in keeping with constitutive self-determi-
nation, are to be developed in accordance with the aspirations of
indigenous peoples themselves. Thus, ILO Convention No. 169
requires the development of "special measures" to safeguard
indigenous "persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and
environment,"89 and specifies that the measures be consistent with
"the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."'" Also, the
Convention requires that consultations with indigenous peoples "be
undertaken, in good faith ... with the objective of achieving
agreement or consent."9'
Professor Erica-Irene A. Daes, the chairperson of the Working
Group, describes the requirements of self-determination in the
88 Government attitudes in favor of the concept of self-determination in association with
indigenous peoples (as opposed to their reservations about express use of the term in this
context) are especially evident in government statements on domestic policies and initiatives.
See generally Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eleventh Session,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, at 22-23 (August 23,1993) [hereinafter 1993 Working Group
Report] (synthesizing government statements on developments under the heading "Right to
Self-Determination and Political Participation").
" ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 80, art. 4, 1.
9 Id. art. 4, 2.9
1 Id. art. 6, 2.
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context of indigenous peoples as entailing a form of belated state-
building through negotiation or other appropriate peaceful proce-
dures involving meaningful participation by indigenous groups.92
According to Professor Daes, self-determination entails a process
through which indigenous peoples are able to join
with all the other peoples that make up the State on
mutually-agreed upon and just terms, after many
years of isolation and exclusion. This process does
not require the assimilation of individuals, as citi-
zens like all others, but the recognition and incorpo-
ration of distinct peoples in the fabric of the State,
on agreed terms.93
In a case illustrative of the contemporary international indige-
nous rights regime, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights promoted such belated state-building as a means of
remedying the effective denial of self-determination suffered by the
Miskito and other Indians of the Atlantic Coast region of Nicara-
gua.94 Effectively equating self-determination with decolonization
procedures, the Commission found that the Indians were not self-
determination beneficiaries.95 However, defying its own formal-
ism, the Commission acknowledged the inequitable condition of the
Indians dating from their forced incorporation into the Nicaraguan
state and found that their ability to develop freely in cultural and
economic spheres was suppressed by the existing governing
" Erica-Irene A. Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination, 3 TRANSN'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 (1993).
"Id.
OAS Inter-American Comm'n Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly
Settlement Procedure Regarding the Human Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan
Population ofMiskito Origin, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS Doc. No. OEA/ser. LIV/1I.62, doc. 10 rev.
3 (1983), OEA/ser. LUV/II.62, doc. 26 (1984) [hereinafter Miskito Case].
The history of the Atlantic Coast region is summarized in JORGE JENKINS MOLIERI, EL
DEsAFIo INDIGENA EN NICARAGUA: EL CASO DE LOS MISKITOs 33-114 (1986); Theodore
Macdonald, The Moral Economy of the Miskito Indians: Local Roots of a Geopolitical
Conflict, in ETHNIcITIES AND NATIONS: PROCESSES OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC 107, 114-22 (Remo Guidieri et al. eds., 1988).




The Commission found the Indians were entitled to "special legal
protection" grounded in relevant human rights precepts and
accordingly prescribed the elaboration of a new political order for
the Indiansg'--in effect, a remedy to implement an ongoing
condition of self-determination where it had been denied. And, in
accordance with precepts of constitutive self-determination, which
also had been denied, the Commission further held that such a
remedy "can only effectively carry out its assigned purposes to the
extent it is designed in the context of broad consultation, and
carried out with the direct participation of the ethnic minorities of
Nicaragua, through their freely chosen representatives.""
C. THE CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS CONCERNING INDIGE-
NOUS PEOPLES: ELABORATIONS UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION
99
As indicated by the foregoing discussion, there is a developing
body of international norms concerning indigenous peoples that
contains substantive and remedial prescriptions grounded in the
principle of self-determination and related human rights precepts.
The norms establish the benchmarks for ensuring indigenous
peoples of ongoing self-determination, including the minimum
range of choices to which indigenous peoples are entitled in
remedial-constitutive settings (that is, remedial procedures that
require change in the governing institutional order). The interna-
tional norms concerning indigenous peoples, which thus elaborate
upon the requirements of self-determination, generally fall within
the following categories: cultural integrity, lands and resources,
social welfare and development, and self-government. These
norms, the underpinnings and contours of which are discussed
subsequently, comprise minimum standards for the development of
remedial measures for the benefit of Native Hawaiians.
1. Cultural Integrity. A central aspect of self-determination,
"Id. at 1-7, 81.
97ld. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
Parts of the discussion under this subheading are adapted from parts of the author's
previous article, Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms, supra note 85, at 15-39.
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particularly in its ongoing aspect, is the ability of groups to
maintain and freely develop their cultural identities. The notion of
respect for cultural determinism has long been a feature of bilateral
as well as multilateral treaties. 10 Especially noteworthy today
is article 27 of the United States-ratified International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.'' Article 27 affirms in universalist
terms the right of persons belonging to "ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities... to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, [and] to use their own language."
10 2
The cultural integrity norm, particularly as embodied in article
27, has been the basis of decisions favorable to indigenous peoples
by the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American
States. Both bodies have held the norm to cover all aspects of an
indigenous group's survival as a distinct culture, understanding
culture to include economic or political institutions, land use
10 See, e.g., NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
7 (1991) (listing treaties associated with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and other pre-Worid
War II European treaties with provisions protecting the rights of religious and ethnic
minorities). Today, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ., T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into
force, Sept. 3, 1953), upholds rights of freedom of expression, id. art. 10, religion, id. art. 9,
and "association with a national minority," id. art. 14.
Beyond the European context, the Anti-Genocide Convention, the first U.N. sponsored
human rights treaty, upholds that all cultural groupings have, at a minimum, a right to
exist. Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (defining, at art. I, genocide as "acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such").
See also The Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 5, 429
U.N.T.S. 93, 100 (entered into force May 22, 1962) (recognizing "the right of members of
national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance
of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of
their own language); Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation,
Proclaimed by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, 14th Sess., Nov. 4,1966, art. 1, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 410, U.N. Doc. STIHR/1/rev.3
(1988) (affirming, inter alia, that "[e]ach culture has a dignity and value which must be
respected and preserved").
101 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 27.
102 Id.
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patterns, as well as language and religious practices." 3 Interna-
tional practice related to the U.N. Working Group and to the
negotiation and adoption of the text of ILO Convention 169 is in
accord with this interpretation of the norm of cultural integrity in
the context of indigenous peoples.
0 4
" In the case concerning the Indians of Nicaragua discussed previously, see supra notes
94-98 and accompanying text, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found,
citing article 27, that the "special legal protections" accorded the Indians for the preservation
of their cultural identity should extend to "the aspects linked to productive organization,
which includes, among other things, the issue of ancestral and communal lands." Miskito
Case, supra note 94, at 81, 15. See also Res. No. 12/85, Case No. 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
24,29-31 (1985) in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1984-85, OEAISer.LV/IH.66, Doc. 10, Rev. 1 (1985) (1985 Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights decision on the Yanomami of Brazil) (invoking article 27, even though Brazil
is not a party to the Covenant, and holding Brazil to a broad cultural integrity norm
protective of the Yanomami's cultural traditions, including those associated with their
ancestral lands); Ominayak, Chief ofthe Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Report of the Human
Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, Vol. H, Annex IX(A) (1990) (finding a violation of
article 27 by the permitting of oil and gas exploration in lands upon which the Lubicon Lake
Band relied for economic and cultural survival); Kitok v. Sweden, in Report of the Human
Rights Committee, supra, 9.6 (holding article 27 to cover economic activity, such as
reindeer husbandry where "that activity is an essential element in the culture of an ethnic
community').
104 Ambassador Espafia-Smith of Bolivia, Chairman of the ILO Conference Committee
that drafted Convention No. 169, summarized the consensus of the Committee as ultimately
reflected in the text:
The proposed Convention takes as its basic premise respect for the
specific characteristics and the differences among indigenous and tribal
peoples in the cultural, social and economic spheres. It consecrates
respect for the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these
peoples in the general framework of guarantees enabling them to
maintain their own different identities and ensuring self-identification,
totally exempt from pressures which might lead to forced assimilation,
but without ruling out the possibility of their integration with other
societies and life-styles as long as this is freely and voluntarily chosen.
International Labour Conference, Provisional Record 31, 76th Sess., at 31/4-5 (1989).
[hereinafter 1989 ILO Provisional Record 31]. See also International Labour Conference,
Provisional Record 32, 75th Sess., at 32/11-13, (1988) [hereinafter 1988 ILO Provisional
Record 32]. The same cultural integrity theme is at the core of the draft indigenous rights
declarations produced by the chair of the U.N. Working Group pursuant to that body's
standard-setting mandate. See, e.g., First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/§ 6, Annex II, preambular
para. 7 (1989) ("Endorsing calls for the consolidation and strengthening of indigenous
societies and their cultures ... ."). States have joined indigenous rights advocates in
expressing widespread agreement with that essential thrust even while diverging in their
views on particular aspects of the drafts. This is evident, inter alia, in the documents
produced by the Working Group Chair synthesizing government and other statements
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While in principle the cultural integrity norm can be understood
to apply to all segments of humanity, the norm has developed
remedial aspects particular to indigenous peoples in light of their
historical and continuing vulnerability. As the international
community has come to consider indigenous cultures as equal in
value to all others, the cultural integrity norm has developed to
entitle indigenous groups like the Native Hawaiian people to
affirmative measures to remedy the past undermining of their
cultural survival and to guard against continuing threats in this
regard. It is not sufficient, therefore, that states simply refrain
from coercing assimilation of indigenous peoples or abandonment
of their cultural practices. ILO Convention No. 169 provides:
Governments shall have responsibility for develop-
ing, with the participation of the peoples concerned,
coordinated and systematic action to protect the
rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for
their integrity. °5
The 1993 Working Group Draft Declaration echoes the requirement
of "effective measures" to secure indigenous culture in its many
manifestations."'° Comments to the Working Group by govern-
ments and relevant non-governmental actors, as well as trends in
government initiatives domestically, indicate broad acceptance of
the cultural integrity norm along with its requirement of affirma-
tive action in the context of indigenous peoples.
107
Government representatives have been quick to point out the
commenting on the drafts: Analytical Commentary on the Draft Principles Contained in the
First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.211990/39 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Analytical Commentary]; Analytical
Compilation of Observations and Comments Received Pursuant to Sub-Commission
Resolution 1988/18, U.N. Doc. EICNA/Sub.2/1989/33/Adds.1-3 (1989) [hereinafter 1990
Analytical Compilation].
106 ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 80, art. 2, 1 1.
106 1993 Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 87, art. 13 (with particular regard
to religion); id. art. 14 (historiography, language, philosophy, and literature); id. art. 15
(education); see also id. art. 12 (restitution of cultural and intellectual property).
101 See Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms, supra note 85, at 21-23 & nn. 80-98 (discussing
comments in the drafting process and government reports on domestic initiatives); see also
U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 75, Add.3, 1 12 (1983) ("The fact that the State has clear
positive responsibilities in matters of cultural rights is generally recognized today.").
19941
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diversity among indigenous groups in the context of efforts to
articulate prescriptions protective of indigenous rights." That
diversity, however, does not undermine the strength of the cultural
integrity norm as much as it leads to an understanding that the
norm requires diverse applications in diverse settings. In all cases,
the operative premise is that of securing the survival and flourish-
ing of indigenous cultures through mechanisms devised in accor-
dance with the preferences of the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. Lands and Natural Resources. The importance of lands and
resources to the survival of indigenous cultures is widely acknowl-
edged. °9 Relevant to indigenous peoples' linkage with lands and
natural resources is the self-determination provision common to the
International Human Rights Covenants, which affirms: "In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." n1
This prescription intersects with the idea of property, a long
established feature which, in various formulations, is common to
societies throughout the world."'
'8 See, e.g., Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights
of Indigenous Populations: Information Received from Governments, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/-
Sub.2/AC.4/1990/1/Add.3, at 1-2 (1990) (containing information received by the Government
of Canada regarding Revised Draft Declaration of Indigenous Rights); Statement of the
Government of New Zealand to the U.N. Working Group Under Item 4, at 2 (1991) (on file
with author).
log See, e.g., supra note 103 (discussing Inter-American Human Rights Commission and
U.N. Human Rights Committee cases); see also U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 75, Add.4,
at 39:
It must be understood that, for indigenous populations, land does not
represent simply a possession or means of production .... It is also
essential to understand the special and profoundly spiritual relationship
of indigenous peoples with Mother Earth as basic to their existence and
to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture.
110 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, art. 1, 1 2;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 27, art. 1, 1 2.
... The concept of property includes the notion that human beings have rights to lands
and chattels that they, by some measure of legitimacy, have reduced to their own control.
See generally REN9 DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAw 290-95 (3d ed. 1985)
(containing a comparative discussion of "ownership" in the Soviet legal system); 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (on property in the British Common Law). Legal systems have
varied in prescribing the rules by which the rights are acquired and in defining these rights.
The most commonly noted dichotomy is between the system of private property rights in
Western societies and classical Marxist systems in which the state retains formal ownership
of all real estate and natural resources while granting rights of use. For sources reflecting
many of the dimensions of this dichotomy, see: Randy Bergman & Dorothy C. Lawrence,
346
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Property has been affirmed as an international human right.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "[e]veryone
has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others," and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property.""' These precepts are repeated in the American
Convention on Human Rights.
113
In contemporary international law, modern notions of cultural
integrity and self-determination join property precepts in the
affirmation of indigenous land and resource rights, as evident in
ILO Convention No. 169.114 In its article 14(1), Convention No.
169 affirms:
The rights of ownership and possession of [indige-
nous peoples] over the lands which they traditionally
occupy shall be recognised. In addition, measures
shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the
right of the peoples concerned to use lands not
exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have
traditionally had access for their subsistence and
traditional activities." 5
Article 15, furthermore, specifies the right "to participate in the
use, management and conservation" of the natural resources
New Developments in Soviet Property Law 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 189 (1990)
(discussing recent economic and political reforms in Soviet Union that altered traditional
notions of State ownership and control of property); Edward J. Epstein, The Theoretical
System of Property Rights in China's General Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical
Controversy in the Drafting Process and Beyond, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177 (1989)
(discussing property rights in China and the effect China's General Principles of Civil Law
may have on these rights); Symposium, Property: The Founding, the Welfare State, and
Beyond: The Eighth Annual National Federalist Society Symposium on Law and Public
Poliey-1989,13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 1, 1-165 (1990) (discussing various topics in property
law, such as property and the Constitution, regulation ofproperty, and intellectual property).
The common feature of the property regimes discussed in these articles, however, is that
people do acquire and retain rights of a proprietary nature in relation to other people, and
respect for those rights should be valued.
" Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, GA. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., pt. 1, 138th plen. mtg. at 135, U.N. Dc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
11 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official
Records, OEA/ser.K/XVL/1.1, Dec. 65, rev. 1, Corr. 1 (1970), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
14 ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 80.
11 Id. art. 14, 1.
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pertaining to their lands."6
The land rights provisions of Convention No. 169 are framed by
article 13(1), which states:
In applying the provisions of this Part of the
Convention governments shall respect the special
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of
the peoples concerned of their relationship with the
lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they
occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the
collective aspects of this relationship.
117
Use of the words "traditionally occupy" in article 14, as opposed
to use of the past tense of the verb, suggests that the occupancy
must be connected with the present in order for it to give rise to
possessory rights. In light of the article 13 requirement of respect
for cultural values related to land, however, a sufficient present
connection with lost lands may be established by a continuing
cultural attachment to them, particularly if dispossession occurred
recently.
Also relevant in this regard is article 14(3), which mandates
"[a]dequate procedures ... within the national legal system to
resolve land claims by" indigenous peoples."' This provision is
without any temporal limitation and thus empowers claims
originating well in the past. Article 14(3) is a response to the
historical processes that have afflicted indigenous peoples, includ-
ing the Native Hawaiians, by trampling on their cultural attach-
ment to ancestral lands, disregarding or minimizing their legiti-
mate property interests, and leaving them without adequate means
of subsistence. In light of the acknowledged centrality of lands and
resources to indigenous cultures and economies, the requirement to
provide meaningful redress for indigenous land claims implies an
obligation on the part of states to provide remedies that include for
indigenous peoples the option of regaining lands and access to
116 Id. art. 15, 1.11
7 Id. art. 13, 1.
"S Id. art. 14,1 3.
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natural resources.'19
The essential aspects of Convention No. 169's land rights
provisions are supported by an expanding nexus of international
opinion and practice. 120  Government statements to the U.N.
Working Group confirm general acceptance of at least the core
aspects of the land rights norms expressed in Convention No. 169.
Government statements tell of worldwide initiatives to secure
indigenous possessory and use rights over land and to redress
historical claims.' 2' And, discussions over language for the
"' A concurring analysis of the land rights provisions of Convention No. 169 is provided
in the following article by the legal officer of the International Labour Organization primarily
involved in the drafting of the Convention: Lee Sweptson, A New Step in the International
Law of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 677, 696-710 (1990).
', Although the drafting of the land rights provisions of Convention No. 169 was
controversial, the controversy was a result of efforts by indigenous peoples' representatives,
worker delegates, and some governments to attain specification of greater land and resource
rights than that ultimately included in the Convention. Despite the controversy, the land
rights provisions represent a common denominator of opinion. See Sweptson, supra note 119,
at 696-98. The land rights provisions of Convention No. 169 were finalized by a special
working party of the Labour Conference Committee that developed the text of the
Convention, and the Committee approved the provisions by consensus. International Labour
Conference, Provisional Record 25, 76th Sess., at 25/21 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ILO
Provisional Record 25].
121 See, e.g., Honorable Robert Tickner, Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island
Affairs, Statement Before the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 11th Sess.
(speaking on behalf of the Government of Australia) (July 28, 1991) [hereinafter 1991
Statement of Australian Minister of Aboriginal Affairs] (discussing land claim settlement
procedure, following High Court decision affirming aboriginal title); Delegation of the
Observer Government of Brazil on Item 5 of the Agenda: Review of Developments
Pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
of Indigenous Populations, Statement Before the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, 11th Seas. (July 29,1991) [hereinafter 1991 Statement of Observer Government
of Brazil] (discussing development and implementation of constitutional provisions regarding
indigenous land rights); Honorable Gerald E. Shannon, Ambassador and Permanent
Representative, Observor Delegation of Canada, Review of Developments Pertaining to the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
Populations, Statement Before the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 11th
Ses. (July 29, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Statement of Observer Delegation of Canada]
(discussing land claim settlement procedures involving indigenous groups throughout
Canada); Review of Developments Pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Populations, U.N. ESCOR, C.H.R., 9th
Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1991/4 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Review of
Developments] (giving information submitted by the government of Colombia); Review of
Developments Pertaining to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous Populations, U.N. ESCOR, C.H.R., 7th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc.
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indigenous rights declaration include efforts to build on the already
recognized rights.12 It is evident that indigenous land rights
norms, rooted in otherwise accepted precepts of property, cultural
integrity, and self-determination, have made their way not just into
conventional international law, but also into customary law.
3. Social Welfare and Development. As just indicated, indige-
nous peoples' interests in a secure land base are both cultural and
economic. Related to these interests are entitlements of social
welfare and development: entitlements also grounded in the U.N.
Charter and adjoined to the principle of self-determination.
Chapter IX of the Charter, under the heading "International
Economic and Social Co-operation," states in part:
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stabili-
ty and well-being which are necessary for peaceful
E4CN.41Sub.2/AC.4/1989/2 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Review of Developments].
, See 1990 Analytical Commentary, supra note 104, at 10-15 (discussing commentary
by government and indigenous observers on the land rights provisions of the first revised
text of the draft declaration on indigenous rights).
Reflecting the direction of developing global consensus on indigenous land and resource
rights, the 1993 Draft Declaration of the Working Group includes the following.
Article 26
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the
lands and territories, including the total environment of the lands, air,
waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources which
they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. This
includes the right to the full recognition of their laws, traditions and
customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the development and
management of resources, and the right to effective measures by States
to prevent any interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon
these rights.
Article 27
Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands,
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied or used; and which have been confiscated, occupied,
used or damaged without their free and informed consent. Where this
is not possible, they have the right to just and fair compensation. Unless
otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation
shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality,
size and legal status.
1993 Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 87, arts. 26, 27.
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and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and
conditions of economic and social progress and
development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health,
and related problems; and international cultural and
educational co-operation ....
Article 56
All members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the Organization
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.123
Building upon the Charter provisions, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights'24 affirms an array of
social welfare rights and corresponding state obligations that are
to benefit "everyone."125 Emphasized in the Covenant are rights
to health, education, and an adequate standard of living. The
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, the
World Health Organization, and the International Labour Organi-
sation have been the sources of a number of additional instruments
or programs establishing generally applicable standards and
policies within the realm of social welfare concerns.
Linked with those rights of social welfare that generally are
articulated as benefitting the individual is the right to develop-
2 3 U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
1" International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 27.
n E.g., id. art. 6,1 1 (regarding the "right to work, which includes the right of everyone
to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts").
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ment, which has been deemed to extend also to "peoples."" In
December of 1986, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by an
overwhelming majority the "Declaration on the Right to Develop-
ment."'27  The Declaration defines the right to development as
"an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to,
and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully
realized." 128 The greater part of the Declaration is occupied with
articulating a series of duties on the part of states to promote and
ensure the realization of the right to development through interna-
tional cooperation and domestic programs.2 9
Within the framework of the foregoing precepts, a special rubric
of entitlements and corresponding duties has developed with regard
to indigenous peoples. These norms are aimed at remedying two
distinct but related historical phenomena that result in most
indigenous communities living in an economically disadvantaged
condition. The first such phenomenon entails the progressive
plundering of indigenous peoples' lands and resources over time,
processes that have impaired or, as in the case of Native Hawai-
ians, devastated indigenous economies and subsistence life and left
indigenous people among the poorest of the poor.'o The second
16 See generally Roland Rich, The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples?, in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 39 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (providing justification for the right to
development and defending it against skeptics).
127 G. Res. 411128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986) (adopted by a vote of 146 in favor, 1 against, and 8 abstentions). Although the United
States (alone) voted against the declaration, its express reason concerned not the essential
normative thrust of the declaration, but rather alleged "imprecise and confusing" language,
the declaration's linkage between disarmament and development, and disagreement with a
perceived emphasis on transfers of resources from the developed to the developing world as
the primary means of achieving development. Rich, supra note 126, at 52.
A precursor to the 1986 Declaration was the Declaration on Social Progress and
Development, G.A. Res. 2542(XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A17630 (1969).
'2 GAL. Res. 41128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986).129 Id. arts. 2-8, 10.
'30 See generally JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 17-33 (1987) (describing "Life at the Bottom" for the world's




corresponds with patterns of discrimination that have tended to
exclude members of indigenous communities from enjoyment of the
social welfare benefits generally available in the states within
which they live.
131
In response to these historical phenomena, ILO Convention No.
169 establishes "as a matter of priority" the "improvement of the
conditions of life and work and levels of health and education of
[indigenous] peoples," and it mandates "[sipecial projects ... to
promote such improvement." 132  The Convention, furthermore,
specifies duties on the part of states to ensure the absence of
discriminatory practices and effects in areas of employment,
vocational training, social security and health, education, and
means of communication. 133  The Convention emphasizes, in
accordance with core precepts of self-determination, that the special
programs devised to ensure the social welfare and development of
indigenous peoples are to be established in cooperation with the
indigenous peoples concerned 1 4 and in accordance with their own
collectively formulated priorities.'35 The 1993 Working Group
Draft Declaration follows in the same vein of Convention No. 169,
stating that indigenous peoples are entitled "to have access to
adequate financial and technical assistance, from States and
through international cooperation, to pursue freely their political,
economic, social, cultural and spiritual development."3 6
The provisions of Convention No. 169 and the 1993 Working
Group Draft Declaration just noted represent a certain consensus
that extends well beyond the members of the Working Group and
the states that have ratified Convention No. 169. Although there
is some controversy about the outer bounds of state obligation to
promote indigenous social welfare and development, little or no
controversy is evident over the proposition that some level of state
'31 Seegenerally U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 75, Add. 4, 1 54-119, 163-190, U.N.
Sales No. E.86.xV.3 at 7-9, 14-15 (describing discriminatory rendering of government
services in areas of health, housing, education, and employment).
132 ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 80, art. 7, 2.
'33 Id. arts. 20-31.
'3 E.g., id. art. 20, 1 (stating that "special measures" regarding conditions of
employment are to be adopted "in co-operation with the peoples concerned").
13 See id. art. 7, 1 ("The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own
priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions ...
1" 1993 U.N. Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 87, art. 38.
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obligation exists in this regard. In reports on domestic initiatives
to the U.N. Working Group and other international bodies, states
increasingly have indicated their assent to duties to take steps and
commit resources to advance the social welfare and development of
indigenous individuals and communities.
3 7
4. Self-Government. Self-government is the overarching political
dimension of ongoing self-determination, a dimension that extends
in favor of indigenous peoples including Native Hawaiians no less
than others. Along with variance in political theory, conceptions
about the normative elements of self-government vary. It is
possible, however, to identify a core of widely held conviction about
the self-government concept. That core consists of the idea that
government is to function according to the will of the people
governed. Self-government stands in opposition to institutions that
disproportionately or unjustly concentrate power over the reigns of
government, whether the concentration is centered within the
relevant community-as in cases of despotic or racially discrimina-
tory rule-or outside of the community-as in cases of foreign
domination.' Conceptions of self-government increasingly are
137 See, e.g., 1991 Statement of the Australian Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, supra note
121, at 2, 10-13 (reporting measures to implement and "[floster a commitment from
[Australian] governments at all levels to cooperate to address progressively aboriginal
disadvantage and aspirations in relation to land, housing, law and justice, cultural heritage,
education, employment, health, infrastructure, economic development and other relevant
matters"); 1993 Statement of Observer Government of Brazil, supra note 121, at 4-5
(discussing government agency actions to address health care concerns of indigenous
communities); Miriama Evans, New Zealand Statement on Recent Developments Before the
U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 11th Sess. (July 27,1993) (discussing health
care reforms and initiatives to benefit the indigenous Maori and reporting government
support for Maori educational programs).
" The international community recognized classical colonial institutions of government
as contrary to self-government, subjecting people to "alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation," Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, supra note 27, 1, and hence the term "non-self-governing territories" was
appropriated to designate the beneficiaries of decolonization. U.N. Charter Chapter XI,
discussed supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text, concerns obligations of member states
with regard to "Non-Self-Governing Territories," which were generally understood at the time
of the Charter's adoption to include territories of a classical colonial type. See OFUATEY-
KODJOE, supra note 53, at 104-13.
354 [Vol. 28:309
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
conditioned by precepts of democracy'39 and corollary notions of
decentralized government.
140
In the particular context of indigenous peoples, notions of
democracy (including decentralized government) join with precepts
of cultural integrity to create a sui generis self-government norm.
The norm upholds the accommodation of spheres of governmental
or administrative autonomy for indigenous communities, while at
the same time upholding measures to ensure their effective
participation in all decisions affecting them left to the larger
institutions of government.
ILO Convention No. 169 upholds the right of indigenous peoples
to "retain their own customs and institutions";141 and requires
that "the methods customarily practised by the peoples concerned
for dealing with offences committed by their members shall be
respected." Similarly, the 1993 Working Group Draft Declara-
tion states: "Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop
and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive
juridical customs, traditions, procedures and practices, in accor-
dance with internationally recognized human rights standards."'
Independently of the extent to which indigenous peoples have
retained culturally specific institutions, they are entitled to develop
autonomous governance appropriate to their circumstances on
'" There is a budding amount of scholarly literature articulating emerging rights of
"political participation" and "democratic governance" under international law. E.g., MORTON
H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 60-65 (1992); Gregory
H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INTL L. 539
(1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46 (1992).
1 Emphasis within Western democratic theory and the importance of local government
within a larger political framework is longstanding. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 4-17 (1988) (discussing dominant
strands of political theory adopted by framers of U.S. Constitution). See generally
FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION: CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF TERRITORIAL
DECENTRALIZATION IN FEDERAL AND CENTRALIZED STATES (Thomas Fleiner-Gerster & Silvan
Hutter eds., 1987) (collecting reports from Regional Conference of International Association
of Constitutional Law in Murten, Switzerland, 1984). The idea of decentralized governance
is reflected not only in Western societies, but also in the traditional institutions of indigenous
communities, including traditional Native Hawaiian institutions. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
141 ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 80, art. 8, 2.
242 Id. art. 9.
"a 1993 U.N. Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 87, art. 33.
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grounds instrumental to securing ongoing self-determination. In
general, autonomous governance for indigenous communities is
instrumental to their capacities of control over the development or
revitalization of the multifaceted aspects of their distinctive
cultures, including those aspects related to land and resource use.
In the context of Native Hawaiians, Michael Dudley and Keoni
Agard echo the demand for "nationhood" and "sovereignty"-that is,
some form of autonomous political status for Native Hawaiians-as
a means of securing space for the education of children in Hawaiian
ways, for the revitalization of the Hawaiian language, for the
reclaiming of the Native Hawaiian spiritual heritage and connec-
tion with the natural world, and, in general, for the natural
evolution of Hawaiian culture cushioned from the onslaught of
outside influences that have thus far had devastating effects.'"
Autonomous governance, furthermore, is a means of enhancing
democracy. Because of their non-dominant positions within the
states where they live, indigenous communities and their members
typically have been denied full and equal participation in the
political processes that have sought to govern them. Even as
indigenous individuals have been granted full rights of citizenship
and overtly racially discriminatory policies have diminished, the
persistent condition of indigenous groups is typically that of
economically disadvantaged numerical minorities. 145 This condi-
tion, shared by Native Hawaiians, is one of political vulnerabili-
ty."'46 To devolve governmental authority to indigenous communi-
ties is to diminish their vulnerability in the face of powerful
majority or elite interests and to enhance the responsiveness of
government to the unique interests of indigenous communities and
their members.
Hence, the latest Working Group draft declaration states:
14 DUDLEY & AGARD, supra note 2, at 89-99.
14 See BURGER, supra note 130, at 17-33 (describing "Life at the Bottom" for world's
indigenous peoples); see also U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 75, Add. 4, 1 54-301
(describing social and economic conditions of indigenous peoples).
1 The U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 75, observes that "[v]arious factors, economic
and social ones for the most part, everywhere influence the effectiveness of political rights,"
id. Add. 4, 1255, and concludes that political "representation of indigenous peoples remains
inadequate and is sometimes purely symbolic," id. Add. 4, 261.
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Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising
their right to self-determination, have the right to
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to
their internal and local affairs, including culture,
religion, education, information, media, health,
housing, employment, social welfare, economic
activities, land and resources management, environ-
ment and entry by non-members, as well as ways
and means for financing these autonomous func-
tions.
14 7
Manifesting the growing consensus of global opinion and expecta-
tion in this regard, several states in recent years have reported to
international bodies the use of constitutional, legislative, and other
official measures to reorder governing institutional matrixes in
response to indigenous peoples' demands for autonomous gover-
nance and recognition of their culturally specific institutions of
social and political control.
148
... 1993 U.N. Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 87, art. 31.
14 See, e.g., 1991 Statement of Observer Government of Brazil, supra note 121, at 3-4
("tThe Federal Government [of Brazil] is doing its utmost in the implementation of special
policies aimed at ensuring indigenous people ... autonomous organization of their
communities."); 1991 Review of Developments, supra note 121, at 3-5 (outlining Colombian
government's steps to afford indigenous groups "the necessary conditions to organize
themselves in accordance with their own usages and customs and to strengthen indigenous
participation in decision making on policies and programmes affecting them"); 1991
Statement of Observer Delegation of Canada, supra note 121, at 4-5 (government program
by which country's first nations "can negotiate self-government through new legislative
arrangements that reflect more closely their particular circumstances" and 'discussions
[involving indigenous representatives] leading toward the constitutional entrenchment of
aboriginal self-government"); Denis Marantz, Canadian Delegation, Statement Before the
World Conference on Human Rights on the Subject of Indigenous Peoples, Vienna, at 1 (June
22, 1993) (describing efforts at constitutional recognition of aboriginal self-government and
legislation for self-government negotiations across Canada, initiatives aimed at "transferring
to the aboriginal peoples of Canada... increased responsibility for planning and managing
their own affairs"); 1991 Statement of the Australian Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, supra
note 121, at 1-2 (describing "consolidation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission," as "a significant step toward aboriginal self-determination and self-
management"); Lois O'Donoghue, Chairperson of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission in Australia, Statement Before the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, 9th Sess. (July 29, 1991) (describing Commission scheme under which national
elections were held for aboriginal regional councils whose major responsibilities are to
develop regional plans and budgets, to set regional priorities, and to represent aboriginal and
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While the norm of indigenous self-government upholds the
development of autonomous institutions for Native Hawaiians, it
also upholds their effective participation in the larger political
order. The 1993 Working Group draft affirms that "[ijndigenous
peoples have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, at all
islander residents of region and advocate their interests); Philippine Government Statement
Before the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, at 2-3 (1989) (constitutional and
legislative measures for creation of autonomous regions in Muslin Mindanao and Cordilleras,
characterized as 'the granting of autonomy to indigenous populations'); Observer Delegation
of Norway, Statement Before the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 7th Sees.,
at 2 (1989) (1987 legislation concerning establishment of a "Sami assembly," which "will
comprise all matters affecting the Sami people in Norway, and will be elected by direct
elections"); Jens Brosted, Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Contributions to the
International Year for the World's Indigenous People, Statement Before the U.N. Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, 11th Sess., at 2 (representing Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, and the three self-governing territories of the Faroe Islands, Greenland,
and Aland) (describing decision of Nordic Counsel of Ministries "to provide major support for
a joint meeting between the Sami Parliaments in Norway, Sweden and Finland").
After a campaign of criticism against the government of Bangladesh concerning its
treatment of the tribal peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the government of Bangladesh
reported on legislation in that regard. 1989 Review of Developments, supra note 121, at 2-5
(providing information received from Bangladesh). The government reported that the
legislation sets up three "local elected and autonomous government councils ... with
adequate power for the tribal people to run their own affairs and preserve their socio-cultural
heritage and separate identity." Id. at 2.
See also 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 120, at 25/2 (1989) (Report of the
Committee on Convention No. 107). The Government of the Soviet Union informed the
Committee about "associations of indigenous peoples [that] would be set up to improve the
legal status of autonomous groups." Id. "The government member of Honduras drew the
Committee's attention to a new law precluding state interference in matters within the
competence of indigenous peoples, which was drafter [sic] following extensive consultations
with their representatives." Id.
Following the decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in favor of a
new political order for the Indians of the Atlantic Coast Region of Nicaragua, see supra notes
94-98 and accompanying text, the Nicaraguan government entered into negotiations with
Indian leaders and eventually developed a constitutional and legislative regime of political
and administrative autonomy for the Indian populated region. See generally Theodore
MacDonald, The Moral Economy of the Miskito Indians: Local Roots of a Geopolitical
Conflict, in ETHNICITIES AND NATIONS: PROCESSES OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC 107 (Remo Guidieiri et al. eds., 1988). The
Nicaraguan government held out the autonomy arrangement as advancing the self-
determination of the Atlantic Coast Indians. For example, the Nicaraguan Sandinista
government reported on its new autonomy regime to the United Nations Working Group at
its 1988 session. The autonomy regime has been much criticized by a Nicaraguan Indian
Organization, YATAMA, as well as by international advocacy groups, for not sufficiently
meeting Indian aspirations. Nonetheless, the Nicaraguan autonomy statute remains
indicative of an important trend in governmental policy and treatment of indigenous peoples.
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levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their
rights."49 Similarly, ILO Convention No. 169 requires effective
means by which indigenous peoples "can freely participate ... at
all levels of decision-making" affecting them."W It is evident that
this requirement applies not only to decisionmaking within the
framework of domestic or municipal processes but also to decision-
making within the international realm. United Nations bodies and
other international institutions increasingly have allowed for, and
even solicited, the participation of indigenous peoples' representa-
fives in their policymaking and standard-setting work in areas of
concern to indigenous groups.
151
The dual thrust of the normative regime concerning indigenous
peoples' self-government-on the one hand autonomy and on the
other participatory engagement-reflects the view, apparently held
by indigenous peoples themselves, that they are not to be consid-
ered a priori unconnected from larger social and political struc-
tures. Rather, indigenous groups-whether characterized as
communities, peoples, nations or other-are appropriately viewed
as simultaneously distinct yet parts of larger units of social and
political interaction, units which may include indigenous federa-
tions, the states within which they live, and the global community
itself. This view challenges traditional Western conceptions of
mutually exclusive states as the primary factor for locating power
and community and promotes a political order that is less state-
centered and more centered on people living in a world of distinct
yet increasingly integrated and overlapping spheres of community
and authority.
The establishment of self-government for indigenous peoples,
therefore, means the consensual development of a nuanced political
order that accommodates to both inward- and outward-looking
associational patterns. International law does not require or allow
"' 1993 U.N. Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 87, art. 19.
150 ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 80, art. 6, l(b).
1.Thus, indigenous peoples and their organizations have been permitted to participate
in discussions within the United Nations concerning the development of an indigenous rights
declaration and related topics. See Williams, supra note 79, at 676-85 (describing Working
Group processes). Similarly, the International Labour Organization relaxed its rules of
procedure in order to allow indigenous groups limited direct participation in the development
of ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989. Swepston, supra note 119, at 686-87.
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for any one particular form of structural accommodation for all
indigenous peoples-indeed, the very fact of the diversity of
indigenous cultures and their surrounding circumstances belies a
singular formula. The underlying objective of the self-government
norm, however, is that of allowing indigenous peoples to achieve
meaningful self-government through political institutions that
reflect their specific cultural patterns and that permit them to be
genuinely associated with all decisions affecting them on a
continuous basis. Constitutive self-determination, furthermore,
requires that such political institutions not be imposed upon
indigenous peoples but rather be the outcome of procedures that
defer to their preferences.
V. CONCLUSION: THE DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES TO
PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AND IMPLEMENT
RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
The norms just discussed and the underlying principle of self-
determination are binding upon the United States. The United
States is party to the U.N. Charter and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, both of which expressly affirm the
principle of self-determination. The Charter, the Covenant, and
other international treaties to which the United States is a party
include related human rights norms. Particularly relevant are the
cultural rights guarantees expressed in article 27 of the Covenant
and developed through authoritative interpretive processes. The
United States is bound to uphold new and developing international
norms concerning indigenous peoples, insofar as those norms form
part of the principle of self-determination or are derivative of
related treaty norms. The United States is furthermore bound
insofar as the norms concerning indigenous peoples are part of
general or customary international law. Customary norms are
binding upon the constituent units of the world community
regardless of any formal act of assent to those norms.
An integral part of a state's obligations in regards to internation-
al human rights law is the duty to provide an adequate remedy
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where substantive norms are violated.'52 This duty is empha-
sized in the 1993 U.N. Working Group Draft Declaration, which
states: "Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to prompt
decision through mutually acceptable and fair procedures for the
resolution of conflicts and disputes with States, as well as to
effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and
collective rights .... "153
It is evident that the Native Hawaiian people have suffered a
violation of self-determination in both its constitutive and ongoing
aspects. The Native Hawaiian people were forcibly incorporated
into the United States and subjected to colonial administration.
The international community promoted a regime to remedy the
widespread violation of self-determination occasioned by such
colonial patterns in their classical form. Within the framework of
the decolonization regime, the territory of Hawaii became a state
of the United States. The statehood remedy, however, was
inadequate from the standpoint of indigenous Hawaiians.
The Native Hawaiian voice was overpowered by the settler
population in the decisionmaking procedure leading to incorpora-
tion of Hawaii as a state, such that the legitimacy of United States
authority over the Native Hawaiians and their lands remains
questionable. Furthermore, Native Hawaiians have continued to
suffer inequities linked to the historical patterns of colonization,
and the governing institutional order has persisted in thwarting
the ongoing self-determination of Native Hawaiians. This can be
seen especially in light of international developments leading to a
contemporary awareness of and understanding about the elements
of self-determination in the particular context of indigenous
peoples.
The United States is under a duty to ensure action to effectively
remedy the infringement of the human rights of Native Hawaiians
through legislation, programmatic reforms, reparations or other
appropriate means. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
evaluate procedures already initiated in response to demands by
112 For a discussion of state responsibility to effectively remedy violations of human rights
under conventional and customary international law, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAw 136-245 (1989).
'53 1993 U.N. Working Group Draft Declaration, supra note 87, art. 39.
1994]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Native Hawaiians. The point to be made here is that the official
response to the demands of Native Hawaiians is governed by
international law, not just by domestic standards. In order to pass
international muster, remedial measures must at a minimum
implement contemporary norms concerning indigenous peoples,
which include prescriptions relating to rights of cultural integrity,
lands and resources, social welfare and development, and self-
government.
Remedial measures, furthermore, should be the outcome of
procedures devised in accordance with underlying precepts of
constitutive self-determination, and hence such procedures should
entail meaningful participation on the part of the Hawaiian people
and deference to their choices from among justifiable options.
Negotiation is a preferred procedure for the development and
implementation of remedial measures in the context of indigenous
peoples. Negotiations involving truly representative leaders of
indigenous peoples provide a potential framework for the voices of
indigenous communities to be heard and their preferences to be
realized. Negotiation or other procedures responsive to Native
Hawaiian demands must be undertaken in good faith with the
objective of achieving agreement with the Native Hawaiian people
on the remedial measures to be taken, and the procedures must be
backed by the authority necessary to translate their outcome into
practice.
Considerations of state sovereignty form a backdrop for the
elaboration of remedial measures and influence the degree to which
remedies may be subject to international scrutiny. The limitations
of the international doctrine of sovereignty in its state-centered
formulation are essentially twofold. First, sovereignty upholds a
substantive preference for the status quo of political ordering
through its corollaries protecting state territorial integrity and
political unity."5 Second, the doctrine limits the capacity of the
international system to regulate matters within the spheres of
authority asserted by states recognized by the international
community. This limitation upon international competency is
1 These corollaries are included in, inter alia, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 14; United Nations
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 27, Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 27, 6.
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reflected in the U.N. Charter's admonition against intervention "in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state." 55
In a global community that remains organized substantially by
state jurisdictional boundaries, sovereignty principles continue, in
some measure, to advance human values of stability and ordered
liberty, and they guard the people within a state against disruptive
forces coming from outside the state's domestic domain. But since
the atrocities and suffering of the two world wars, international law
will not uphold sovereignty principles that serve as accomplices to
the subjugation of human rights or act as a shield against interna-
tional concern that coalesces to promote human rights. This, of
course, is the lesson of decolonization and the modern human rights
movement within the international system.
Thus, where there is a violation of self-determination and human
rights, as is the case of Native Hawaiians, presumptions in favor
of territorial integrity or political unity of existing states may be
offset to the extent required by an appropriate remedy. 56 Fur-
thermore, heightened international scrutiny is justified in the
degree to which violations of human rights are prone to lingering
unchecked by decisionmakers within the domestic realm.
A level of international scrutiny has already fallen over the
treatment of indigenous peoples in general and Native Hawaiians
in particular. Most notably, the U.N. Working Group on Indige-
nous Populations monitors the human rights conditions of indige-
nous peoples throughout the world. At its annual meetings in
Geneva, the Working Group has regularly heard from indigenous
Hawaiian leaders. Their accounts of the deprivation of Native
Hawaiian self-determination have prompted the chair of the
Working Group to visit Hawaii and investigate the situation.
International scrutiny relevant to the human rights of Native
Hawaiians first came to bear through the decolonization regime.
The U.N. General Assembly has maintained a list of non-self-
166U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7.
16 Cf. United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 27, ("Nothing in the
foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination ofpeoples .... .") (emphasis added).
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governing territories subject to reporting procedures under article
73 of the Charter, and the General Assembly has monitored the
reporting particularly as it has related to corresponding decoloniza-
tion objectives. The territory of Hawaii appeared on the General
Assembly's list until Hawaiian statehood, when the United States
declared itself no longer obligated to submit reports concerning
Hawaii. Given the failure of the statehood remedy to fully roll back
the scourge of colonialism for indigenous Hawaiians and the
persistence of conditions that deprive Native Hawaiians of effective
self-determination and self-government, it would be appropriate for
Hawaii to be placed back on the General Assembly's list and for the
Assembly, through its relevant committees, to resume its scrutiny
of United States action in this regard.
In any case, the United States must take effective measures to
remedy the historical and continuing wrongs suffered by Native
Hawaiians, measures that are in accordance with the choices of
Native Hawaiians themselves and that, at a minimum, implement
corresponding international human rights norms. Under interna-
tional law, all peoples have the right to self-determination-and no
less among them, the Native Hawaiian people.
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